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Centre-Periphery: Russia and its Far East 
 
Paul Richardson, University of Birmingham 
 
The revolutions of 1917, and the end of the Soviet experiment in 1991, reorganized space 
and society in the most profound ways. Yet, these seismic political events never quite overcame 
geography, and the Russian Far East has offered a special vantage point from which to observe 
the struggle to conquer, consolidate, and control space. The experience of the Russian Far East 
underscores the “tyranny of distance” faced by Russia’s leaders.1 It is a region that has 
continually brought into sharp focus a tension between balancing economic expediency, 
dematerialising borders, expanding ties with neighbouring states, and an imperative to maintain 
geopolitical integrity and central authority. This short piece will trace some of the still 
unresolved legacies of revolution, charting the changes and continuities in the geographical 
visions and geopolitical possibilities that have shaped this country and its Far Eastern periphery. 
 
 
The Tyranny of Distance 
 
When the Bolsheviks swept to power in 1917, news of the October Revolution did not 
reach remote areas of the Far East for weeks, and in some cases, even months. This did not 
prevent the Bolsheviks declaring the entire Far East under Soviet rule by the end of the year. 
However, the Party’s organisation in the region was fractious and fragile, and by September 
1918 Soviet rule east of Lake Baikal had collapsed, largely thanks to the intervention of 
expeditionary forces from Japan, Britain, the United States, Canada, France, Italy, and a 
Czechoslovak Legion.
2
 With allied intervention on the side of the Whites during the Russian 
Civil War, the city of Vladivostok became “a world unto itself, a unique blend of provincial 
Russia, treaty-port Shanghai, and the American Wild West.”3 However, this cosmopolitan 
moment did not last, and, by 1920, most of the allied forces, except the Japanese, had departed. It 
was this enduring presence of Japanese troops and interests that contributed to the establishment 
of the Far Eastern Republic (FER) in April 1920, which was designed by Lenin to serve as a 
buffer state in order to buy time for the nascent Soviet state.  
Yet, this independence charade “infected some players with a regionalist virus”4 – a virus 
that proved to be a resistant and contagious one. Even ninety-five years after its inception, the 
FER found itself valorised and reanimated in some quarters as a model for Novorossiya, a 
confederation of the self-proclaimed Donetsk People's Republic and the Lukhansk People's 
Republic in Eastern Ukraine. An article on Nakanune in late 2014 breathlessly recounted the 
brilliance of Lenin’s buffer strategy, and how “the legendary FER can be used as an ideal guide 
for the construction of the young Novorossiya.”5 However, on closer inspection, the FER was far 
from the model the separatists of Lukhansk and Donestsk desired, as even when it expired in 
November 1922, any kind of authority over its vast territory was weak, with locals and 
foreigners able to move freely across its frontiers.
6
   
It was a scenario repeated in the early 1990s when Vladivostok reverberated with the 
echoes of the past. In 1993, a visiting correspondent from the New York Times described the city 
as “Russia’s Wild Far East” with its “heady mix of sudden freedom,” “army of Japanese 
businessmen,” and “anything-goes spirit.”7 Yet, alongside porous borders, and the legal and 
illegal flow of people, goods, and ideas, there also existed a residual cult of the border. In the 
same year as the New York Times’ visit, one journalist from the local newspaper, Vladivostok, 
made his own revelatory visit to the Russian-Chinese border and a Soviet-era memorial to Ivan 
Moshlyak, a hero of a military confrontation with Japan near Lake Khasan in 1938. As he 
recounted: “You begin to understand something when you climb this hill [to Moshlyak’s statue], 
you see Russia as a contiguous state with its own border, where so much blood has been spilt.”8  
Yet, in the 1990s, neither laments for the sacrifices of the past, nor the exhilaration of the 
opening of a once closed space, could compensate locals for the collapse of state-backed 
industries, the degradation of military capabilities, soaring unemployment, collapsing law 
enforcement, exploitation of resources, and a flourishing of corruption and criminality. Between 
1991 and 2012 the Russian Far East lost about one fifth of its population as birth rates collapsed 
and out-migration surged.
9
 It was not the first exodus from the region, as after four years of civil 
war and foreign intervention, the Russian Far East in the early 1920s was in a similar shambles. 
Nearly half the land under cultivation was abandoned, gold production had plummeted to a tenth 
of pre-war levels, railways were left inoperable and the region’s population had fallen by 
200,000 between 1913 and 1926.
10
 Both demanded a radical response from the centre.  
 
 
Return of the Centre? 
 
In 1926, the onetime head of the Provisional Siberian Autonomous Government, Pyotr 
Derber, and his assistants, came up with a strategy for Far Eastern economic development, which 
stressed forging links with Pacific neighbours, constructing new rail lines, and using the export 
of natural resources to pay for imports of technology and equipment. In the same year, the 
economist, Nikolai Arkhipov, also argued that: “the pull toward Pacific markets is the main 
economic force of the Far Eastern region.”11 However, it was a direction decidedly incompatible 
with the autarchy and authoritarianism of Stalin. In 1932, his solution was Soviet largesse, and 
the Second Five Year Plan (1933-38) allocated over seven billion rubles to the Far Eastern 
Region – 10 per cent of total national investment – and included a metallurgical base at 
Komosomolsk, plans for a Baikal-Amur railway, and sea and air routes to the Centre.
12
 As 
Pravda ominously reminded its readers in November 1936, “Comrade Stalin does not take his 
eyes off the Far East.”13 
Russia’s current President, Vladimir Putin, also gazes towards the Pacific with a vision 
that evokes Derber’s desire to develop the region through trade and foreign investment. The most 
symbolic moment in this strategic turn to the East took place in September 2012 when 
Vladivostok hosted the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Summit. In the run up to the 
summit, the city was to be transformed from a city of neglect, criminality, and obscurity into a 
modernized portal to Asia, with Putin declaring that: “We view this dynamic region as the most 
important factor for the successful future of the whole country.”14 Yet, it appeared that the 
modernization of Vladivostok still required direct supervision from the highest levels of 
government. Even in an age of instantaneous information flows, sophisticated surveillance, and 
advanced communications, the then President, Dmitri Medvedev, found it necessary to make a 
number of high-profile visits prior to the summit in order to personally oversee construction and 
ensure projects were completed on time, all the while hoping to deter the misappropriation of 
resources by local elites. 
Making the city ready for APEC 2012 cost around $21 billion, however, in its wake, the 
Vladivostok-based newspaper, Zolotoi Rog, gloomily lamented that: “We don’t even talk 
anymore about bribes, kickbacks, and corporate raiders, as they are chronic and incurable 
problems […The majority of] questions in our country are as always to be resolved exclusively 
in the capital […which…] so totally interferes in the affairs of almost every village or even 
individual companies.”15 While one anonymous administrator of a regional district stated that: 
“To beg for money out of [the regional and federal] budgets has become easier and more 
profitable than to stimulate the growth of the economy on the ground.”16 
This is but the latest instalment in a rich history of the elites of the Russian Far East 
subverting the will of the centre. John Stephan recounts that for most of the 1920s, “Central 
Committee decrees that impinged upon the interests of provincial cliques were imaginatively 
emasculated amid gestures of sedulous compliance.” While with few ties to the Far East, even 
Stalin and his “henchmen made little headway suborning, let alone dislodging regional elites 
during the 1920s.”17 Only the oppressions and mass executions of the late 1930s saw one kind of 
tyranny overcame another. 
After the disorder of the 1990s, from the beginning of the 2000s, a different kind of 
reassertion of central control emerged. The series of “Faustian bargains” made with the various 
republics and regional entities under Yeltsin, were quickly unmade as Putin sought to “re-
establish Moscow's supremacy and to humble the regional barons.” It was highly symbolic that 
this process began in the Far East with the recall of Primorskii region’s “gangster of a governor,” 
Evgenii Nazdratenko, in 2001.
18
 Yet, despite such flourishes from the centre, distance has 
customarily emboldened the temptation to evade the eyes and ears of the centre. When 
Aleksandr Khoroshavin, Governor of Sakhalin, was arrested in March 2015 for taking a $5.6 
million bribe, Mikhail Delyagin suggested that it was no coincidence that it involved such a 
distant corner of Russia: “Sakhalin’s geographic location was one of the reasons why 
Khoroshavin had the illusion of impunity. The island is 10,000 kilometers (an eight-hour flight) 
away from Moscow [...] Khoroshavin’s arrest is a clear signal to civil servants they should begin 





This collection of vignettes on the Russian Far East in the wake of the historical junctures 
of 1917 and 1991 has suggested that rather than alleviating centre-periphery strains, such 
dramatic transformations often exacerbated them.
20
 Cut off from Moscow by Civil War and 
intervention until the early 1920s, and then by economic crisis and unaffordable and broken 
transportation networks in the 1990s, Far Easterners have learned to fend for themselves.
21
 In 
response, each generation of leaders in Moscow has thrown themselves with the same fervour 
and profligacy of resources into trying to transform this region’s relationship with the rest of the 
country. It is a region seemingly always on the precipice of a revolutionary “pivot to Asia,” 
which could change Russia and the world.  
However, the euphoria of revolution and the evocative and exhilarating images of the self 
and their associated representations of space have periodically been dashed on the rocks of local 
resistance. The various projects and attempts to conquer and transform Russia’s Far East have 
usually ended the same, with the centre thwarted and wily local officials taking their tribute. 
Disconnection and dislocation from the centre, and an endless cycle of repetitions, have been an 
enduring feature of the tyranny of distance that has continued to rule Russia. In the aching chasm 
between the centre’s ambitions and the realities of the periphery has emerged a fertile ground – 
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